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Abstract
In this paper we consider propositional calculi, which are finitely axiomatizable
extensions of intuitionistic implicational propositional calculus together with the rules
of modus ponens and substitution. We give a proof of undecidability of the following
problem for these calculi: whether a given finite set of propositional formulas consti-
tutes an adequate axiom system for a fixed propositional calculus. Moreover, we prove
the same for the following restriction of this problem: whether a given finite set of
theorems of a fixed propositional calculus derives all theorems of this calculus. The
proof of these results is based on a reduction of the undecidable halting problem for
the tag systems introduced by Post.
Keywords: Classical and intuitionistic propositional calculi, implicational calculus, finite
axiomatization, tag system.
1 Introduction
In general, a propositional calculus is given by a finite set of propositional formulas over
some signature together with a finite set of rules of inferences. The problem of recognizing
axiomatizations for a propositional calculus is formulated as follows: whether a given finite
set of propositional formulas constitutes (axiomatizes) an adequate axiom system for this
calculus, i.e., each formula of the calculus is derivable from a given set of formulas by the
rules of the calculus. The question of decidability of this problem was proposed by Tarski in
1946 [13]. In this paper we consider only the propositional calculus with the rules of modus
ponens and substitution.
The undecidability of recognizing axiomatizations for the classical propositional calculus
was obtained due to Linial and Post in 1949 [7]. They gave sketch of proofs for a number
of results, one of them expressible in the form that it is undecidable whether a given finite
set of propositional formulas axiomatizes all classical tautologies. Note that they considered
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only formulas over the signature {¬,∨} and the rule of modus ponens was formulated ap-
propriately. Later the proof of their result was restored by Davis [2, pp. 137–142], and a
complete proof appeared in the work of Yntema [16].
For the intuitionistic propositional calculus over the signature {¬,∨,&,→} the same
result was proved by Kuznetsov in 1963 [6]. Moreover, he proved that this holds for ev-
ery superintuitionistic calculus, i.e., a finitely axiomatizable extension of the intuitionistic
propositional calculus. Particularly, this holds for the classical propositional calculus and
the Linial and Post theorem.
In 1961, A. A. Markov (Jr.) proposed the following problem: is it decidable whether
a given finite set of implicational propositional formulas, i.e., formulas over the signature
{→}, axiomatizes all classical implicational tautologies? Kuznetsov in [6] mentioned that
this problem seems to be still open.
In 1994, Marcinkowski [9] proved that Markov’s problem is undecidable. Moreover,
Marcinkowski obtained a much stronger result: fix an implicational propositional tautol-
ogy A that is not of the form B → B for some formula B, then it is undecidable whether A
is derivable from a given finite set of implicational formulas by the rules of modus ponens
and substitution.
Recently, Zolin in 2013 [17] re-established the result of Kuznetsov for the superintuitionis-
tic propositional calculus over the signatures {∧,→} and {∨,→}. It is based on the so-called
tag systems introduced by Post [12] and proposed in 2009 by Bokov [1] for the proof of the
result of Linial and Post. Besides Zolin in [17] gave a detailed and useful historical survey
of related results.
The aim of this paper is to prove the undecidability of the problem of recognizing axiom-
atizations for every superintuitionistic implicational propositional calculus over a signature
containing the connective→. By a superintuitionistic implicational propositional calculus we
mean a finitely axiomatizable extension of intuitionistic implicational propositional calculus.
The paper is organized as follows. In the first part we introduce the basic notation,
give a historical survey of related results, and state our main result. In the second part we
reduce the halting problem for tag systems to the problem of recognizing axiomatizations
for propositional calculi, and prove our main result.
2 Preliminaries and results
Let V be an infinite set of propositional variables. Letters x, y, z, u, etc., are used to denote
propositional variables. The signature Σ is a finite set of connectives. Each connective
is associated with a unique, classical, two-valued truth-function. Usually connectives are
binary or unary such as {¬,∨,∧,→}.
Propositional formulas or Σ-formulas are built up from the signature Σ and propositional
variables from V in the usual way. Capital letters A,B,C, etc., are used to denote proposi-
tional formulas. Throughout the paper, we will omit the outermost parentheses in formulas
and parentheses assuming the customary priority of connectives.
In this paper, we will consider arbitrary signatures containing the binary connective
→. Note that by Gladstone [3] we can suppose that the signature Σ does not contain the
symbol→, but there is some propositional formula having x, y as sole variables, whose truth-
table interpretation is “x implies y”. In this case we denote the specified formula simply by
x→ y.
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A propositional calculus P over a signature Σ (or a Σ-calculus) is a system consisting of
a finite set P of Σ-formulas referred to as axioms and two rules of inference:
1) modus ponens
A,A→ B ⊢ B;
2) substitution
A ⊢ σA,
where σA is the substitution instance of A, i.e., the result of applying the substitution σ to
the formula A.
Denote by [P ] the set of derivable (or provable) formulas of a calculus P . A derivation
in P is defined from the axioms and the rules of inference in the usual way. The statement
that a formula A is drivable from P is denoted by P ⊢ A.
Let us introduce the following partial order relation on the set of all propositional calculus.
We write P1 ≤ P2 (or, equivalently, P2 ≥ P1) if each drivable formula of P1 is also drivable
from P2, i.e., if [P1] ⊆ [P2]. We write P1 ∼ P2 and say that two calculi P1 and P2 are
equivalent if [P1] = [P2]. Finally, we write P1 < P2 if [P1] ( [P2].
Denote by ClΣ the classical propositional calculus over a signature Σ, and by IntΣ the
intuitionistic propositional calculus over a signature Σ [5]. We assume that the signature Σ
of the intuitionistic propositional calculus IntΣ is a subset of the following set of connectives
{∧,∨,¬,→,↔,⊤,⊥}.
Consider the intuitionistic implicational propositional calculus Int{→} with the set of
axioms [4, p.69]:
(A1) x→ (y → x),
(A2) (x→ (y → z))→ ((x→ y)→ (x→ z)).
The classical implicational propositional calculus Cl{→} is obtained from Int{→} by adding
the Peirce law ((x→ y)→ x)→ x [14, p.52].
Now we define some recognizing problems for a fixed propositional calculus P0.
Problem (Recognizing axiomatizations). Given a propositional calculus P , determine
whether P0 ∼ P .
Problem (Recognizing extensions). Given a propositional calculus P , determine whether
P0 ≤ P .
Problem (Recognizing completeness). Given a propositional calculus P such that P ≤ P0,
determine whether P0 ≤ P .
The previous results can be summarized as follows.
Theorem 2.1 (Linial and Post, 1949). The problems of recognizing axiomatizations, exten-
sions, and completeness for Cl{¬,∨} are undecidable.
Theorem 2.2 (Kuznetsov, 1963). Fix a calculus P0 ≥ Int{¬,∨,&,→}, then the problems of
recognizing axiomatizations, extensions, and completeness for P0 are undecidable.
Theorem 2.3 (Marcinkowski, 1994). Fix a {→}-tautology A that is not of the form B → B
for some formula B, then the problem of recognizing extensions for the {→}-calculus {A} is
undecidable.
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Since the implicational calculi Cl{→} and Int{→} can be axiomatized by the following
single formulas, as shown by  Lukasiewicz [8] and Meredith [10],
Cl{→} ∼ {((x→ y)→ z)→ ((z → x)→ (u→ x))}
Int{→} ∼ {((x→ y)→ z)→ (u→ ((y → (z → v))→ (y → v)))}
the following result also makes sense.
Corollary 2.4. The problems of recognizing axiomatizations, extensions,
and completeness for Cl{→} and the problem of recognizing extensions for Int{→} are unde-
cidable.
In 1930, Tarski [14] proved that every propositional calculus, which contains the formulas
x → (y → x) and x → (y → ((x → (y → z)) → z)), can be axiomatized by a single
formula. Since these formulas are derivable from Int{→}, we have the following corollary of
the Marcinkowski result.
Corollary 2.5.
Fix a signature Σ ⊇ {→} and a Σ-calculus P0 ≥ Int{→}, then the problem of recognizing
extensions for P0 is undecidable.
Theorem 2.6 (Zolin, 2013). Fix a signature Σ ⊇ {∧,→} and a Σ-calculus P0 ≥ Int{∧,→},
then the problems of recognizing axiomatizations, extensions, and completeness for P0 are
undecidable.
Our main result is the following theorems.
Theorem 2.7. Fix a signature Σ ⊇ {→} and a Σ-calculus P0 ≥ Int{→}, then the problems
of recognizing axiomatizations and completeness for P0 are undecidable.
3 The proof of undecidability
In order to prove Theorem 2.7, we shall effectively reduce the halting problem for tag systems
to the problem of recognizing completeness for propositional calculi. Then, the proof of
Theorem 2.7 is immediate from the undecidability of the halting problem [11].
More precisely, we fix any signature Σ such that {→} ⊆ Σ and any Σ-calculus P0 ≥
Int{→}. For a given tag system T and a word ω, we will construct a Σ-calculus P = PT,ω,P0
such that P ≤ P0 and T halts on the input word ω iff P0 ≤ P .
First let us recall the notion of a tag system introduced by Post [12].
3.1 Tag systems
Let A be a finite alphabet of letters a1, . . . , am. By A
∗ denote the set of all words over A,
including the empty word. For α ∈ A∗, denote by |α| the length of the word α.
Definition 3.1 (Post, [12]). A tag system is a triple T = 〈A,W, d〉, where A = {a1, . . . , am}
is a finite alphabet of m symbols, W = {ω1, . . . , ωm} ⊆ A
∗ is a set of m words, and d ∈ N
is a deletion number. Each words ωi is associated to the letters ai: a1 → ω1, . . . , am → ωm.
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We say that T is applicable to a word α ∈ A∗ if |α| ≥ d. The application of T to a word
α ∈ A∗ is defined as follows. Examine the first letter of the word α. If it is ai then
1. remove the first d letters from α, and
2. append to its end the word ωi.
Perform the same operation on the resulting word, and repeat the process so long as the
resulting word has d or more letters. To be precise, if α = aiβγ, |β| = d − 1, and γ ∈ A
∗,
then T produces the word γωi from the word aiβγ. Denote this production by aiβγ
T
7−→ γωi.
We write α
T
7=⇒ β if there are words γ1, . . . , γn, n ≥ 1, such that α = γ1, β = γn, and
γi
T
7−→ γi+1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1.
Define the halting problem of tag systems. We say that a tag system T halts on a word
α ∈ A∗ if there exists a word β ∈ A∗ such that α
T
7=⇒ β and T is not applicable to β,
i.e. |β| < d. The halting problem for a fixed tag system T is, given any word α ∈ A∗, to
determine whether T halts on α.
Theorem 3.2 (Minsky, [11]). There is a tag system T for which the halting problem is
undecidable.
Moreover, Wang [15] showed that this holds even for some tag system T with d = 2 and
1 ≤ |ωi| ≤ 3 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m. For this reason, throughout the paper we will assume that
all words ωi are nonempty.
3.2 Encoding of letters and words
Let A be a finite set {a1, . . . , am}. The set of all nonempty words over A is denoted by A
+.
We encode letters and words on A as {→}-formulas.
Fix a variable x0 not occurring in P0. Then the code of the letter ai ∈ A, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m,
is a formula
ai := ((x
0 → x0)→ · · · → x0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
i
→ (x0 → (x0 → x0)).
It is easily shown that Int{→} ⊢ B → A whenever Int{→} ⊢ A. Since x
0 → (x0 → x0) is a
substitution instance of the axiom A1, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 3.3. Int{→} ⊢ a, for every letter a ∈ A.
Now we introduce the following notation. Let x ∨ y be an abbreviation for the following
formula:
(x→ y)→ y.
For a word α = ai1 . . . aik ∈ A
+, we write −→α as a shortcut for the formula
ai1 ∨
(
ai2 ∨ · · · ∨
(
aik−1 ∨ aik
))
,
and ←−α as a shortcut for the formula(
(ai1 ∨ ai2) ∨ · · · ∨ aik−1
)
∨ aik .
The notation can be extended to the alphabet A ∪ V, where V is the infinite set of propo-
sitional variables defined above. For example,
−−→
axby = a ∨
(
x ∨
(
b ∨ y
))
, where a, b ∈ A and
x, y ∈ V.
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Lemma 3.4. In Int{→} the following derivations hold:
Int{→} ⊢ x→ x ∨ y,
Int{→} ⊢ y → x ∨ y.
Proof. The formula y → x ∨ y is the substitution instance of the axiom A1. Since
x, x→ y ⊢ y,
we have Int{→} ⊢ x→ x ∨ y by the deduction theorem.
Definition 3.5. (Zolin, [17]) An alphabetic formula over the alphabet A, or an A-formula
for short, is an arbitrary {∨}-formula over the codes of letters from A. Formally, a is a
A-formula for each letter a ∈ A, and if A, B are A-formulas then so is A ∨B.
In particular, −→α and ←−α are A-formulas. Lemma 3.3 and Lemma 3.4 imply:
Lemma 3.6. Int{→} ⊢ A, for every A-formula A.
Given a formula A, denote by A∗ the set of all substitution instances of A. Similarly,
given a set M of formulas, denote by M∗ the set
M∗ :=
⋃
A∈M
A∗.
In accordance with [17] let us call two formulas A and B unifiable if A∗ ∩ B∗ 6= ∅.
Lemma 3.7. No two distinct A-formulas are unifiable.
Proof. By induction on the definition of an A-formula A.
Let A be the code of a letter ai ∈ A. If B is the code of a letter aj ∈ A, then i 6= j.
Without loss of generality, i < j. Denote by C the following formula
((y → x0)→ · · · → x0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
i
→ (x0 → (x0 → x0)).
Since ai is the substitution instance of C with respect to replacing the propositional variable
y by x0 and aj is the substitution instance of C with respect to replacing the propositional
variable y by
((x0 → x0)→ · · · → x0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
j−i
,
we conclude that A and B are not unifiable.
If B is a formula B1 ∨ B2 for some A-formulas B1 and B2, then A = ai is a substitution
instance of
(y → x0)→ (x0 → (x0 → x0))
andB is the substitution instance of (u→ v)→ v. Since the formulas x0 and x0 → (x0 → x0)
are not unifiable, we see that A and B are not unifiable either.
Now let A = A1 ∨ A2 for some A-formulas A1 and A2, so it can be assumed that
B = B1 ∨ B2 for some A-formulas B1 and B2. If A, B are unifiable, then also A1, B1 and
A2, B2 are unifiable. By induction hypothesis, A1 = B1 and A2 = B2. Hence, A = B.
This completes the proof of the lemma.
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Denote by ⊲ the following formula
((x0 → x0)→ x0)→ x0.
Since formulas x→ x and (y → z)→ z are not unifiable, we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 3.8. Formulas ⊲, ⊲ → A are not unifiable for any formula A, and formulas ⊲,
(⊲→ B)→ C are also not unifiable for any formulas B, C.
Next, we define the code of a word α ∈ A+ as the finite set Code(α) consisting of all
tautologies of the following four types:
Type 0 ⊲→ −→α
Type 1 ⊲→ −→α1 ∨
−→α2 α = α1α2, |α1| ≥ 2, |α2| ≥ 1;
Type 2 ⊲→ (←−α1 ∨
−→α2) ∨
−→α3 α = α1α2α3, |α1| ≥ 2, |α2| ≥ 2, |α3| ≥ 1;
Type 3 ⊲→←−α1 ∨
−→α2 α = α1α2, |α1| ≥ 3, |α2| ≥ 1.
Furthermore, we will call each formula of Code(α) as the code of same word α. The code of
type 0 is said to be canonical.
3.3 Construction of the calculus PT,ω,P0
Let T = 〈A,W, d〉 be a tag system, ω a nonempty word over A, and P0 a Σ-calculus. Recall
that A = {a1, . . . , am}, W = {ω1, . . . , ωm}, and all ωi are assumed to be nonempty. Denote
by PT,ω,P0 a Σ-calculus with axioms:
(Wω) ⊲→
−→ω ,
(T1) (⊲→
−−−→aiαy )→ (⊲→
−→yωi), for all α ∈ A
∗, |α| = d− 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ m,
(T2) (⊲→
−−→aiα )→ (⊲→
−→ωi), for all α ∈ A
∗, |α| = d− 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ m,
(H) (⊲→ −→α )→ A, for all α ∈ A∗, 0 < |α| < d, A ∈ P0,
(R1) (⊲→ (y ∨
−→az) ∨ u)→ (⊲→ (←−ya ∨ z) ∨ u), for all a ∈ A,
(R2) (⊲→
←−ya ∨ z)→ (⊲→ y ∨ −→az), for all a ∈ A.
Let PT be the subsystem of PT,ω,P0 consisting of axioms T1, T2, R1, R2 and PT,ω =
PT ∪ {Wω}. Now we prove some properties of the calculus PT,ω,P0.
Lemma 3.9. PT,ω ≤ Int{→}.
Proof. Easily follows from Lemmas 3.3, 3.4 and 3.6.
Corollary 3.10. PT,ω,P0 ≤ P0.
3.4 Derivability of the T -productions
Here we show that the calculus PT can “simulate” productions of the tag system T . At the
beginning let us prove auxiliary lemmas.
Lemma 3.11. R1,⊲→ (
←−
ξ ∨
−→
β ) ∨
−→
ζ ⊢ ⊲→
←−
ξβ ∨
−→
ζ , for all ξ, β, ζ ∈ A+.
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Proof. By induction on |β|. If |β| = 1, then the formulas ⊲→ (
←−
ξ ∨
−→
β )∨
−→
ζ and ⊲→
←−
ξβ∨
−→
ζ
are identical.
Now let |β| ≥ 2, then β = aδ for a letter a ∈ A and a nonempty word δ. Therefore,
R1, ⊲→ (
←−
ξ ∨
−→
aδ) ∨
−→
ζ ⊢ ⊲→ (
←−
ξa ∨
−→
δ ) ∨
−→
ζ
by modus ponens. By induction hypothesis, we have
R1, ⊲→ (
←−
ξa ∨
−→
δ ) ∨
−→
ζ ⊢ ⊲→
←−
ξβ ∨
−→
ζ .
This completes the proof of the lemma.
Corollary 3.12. R1, ⊲→
−→
ξ ∨
−→
ζ ⊢ ⊲→
←−
ξ ∨
−→
ζ , for all ξ, ζ ∈ A+.
Lemma 3.13. R2, ⊲→
←−
ξ ∨
−→
ζ ⊢ ⊲→
−→
ξζ, for all ξ, ζ ∈ A+.
Proof. By induction on |ξ|. If |ξ| = 1, then the formulas ⊲ →
←−
ξ ∨
−→
ζ and ⊲ →
−→
ξζ are
identical.
Now let |ξ| ≥ 2, then ξ = βa for a letter a ∈ A and a nonempty word β. Therefore,
R2, ⊲→
←−
βa ∨
−→
ζ ⊢ ⊲→
←−
β ∨
−→
aζ
by modus ponens. By induction hypothesis, we have
R2, ⊲→
←−
β ∨
−→
aζ ⊢ ⊲→
−→
ξζ.
This completes the proof of the lemma.
Corollary 3.14. R1, R2, ⊲→
−→
ξ ∨
−→
ζ ⊢ ⊲→
−→
ξζ, for all ξ, ζ ∈ A+.
Lemma 3.15. If ξ
T
7−→ ζ then PT , ⊲→
−→
ξ ⊢ ⊲→
−→
ζ , for all ξ, ζ ∈ A+.
Proof. Since T is applicable to ξ, we have |ξ| ≥ d. Therefore, ξ = aiαβ and ζ = βωi, where
|α| = d− 1 and |β| ≥ 0.
If |β| = 0, then
PT ⊢ (⊲→
−→
ξ )→ (⊲→
−→
ζ ) by the axiom (T2), and
PT , ⊲→
−→
ξ ⊢ ⊲→
−→
ζ by modus ponens.
Let |β| > 0, so
PT ⊢ (⊲→
−→
ξ )→ (⊲→
−→
β ∨ −→ωi) by the axiom (T1),
PT , ⊲→
−→
ξ ⊢ ⊲→
−→
β ∨ −→ωi by modus ponens,
PT , ⊲→
−→
ξ ⊢ ⊲→
−→
ζ by Corollary 3.14.
The lemma is proved.
Corollary 3.16. If ξ
T
7=⇒ ζ then PT , ⊲→
−→
ξ ⊢ ⊲→
−→
ζ , for all ξ, ζ ∈ A+.
The proof is trivial by definition of the tag system.
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3.5 Production of the PT -derivations
Here we show that the tag system T can produce, on the input word ω, the words whose
codes have derivations in PT,ω,P0 of a “small” height (to be defined below). As a preliminary
let us introduce some notation and prove auxiliary lemmas.
Given α ∈ A∗, denote by CodeT (α) the set of formulas:
CodeT (α) :=
⋃
β∈A∗, α
T
7=⇒β
Code(β).
It is clear that Code(α) ⊆ CodeT (α) for all α ∈ A
∗.
For any propositional calculus P , denote by 〈P 〉 the set of propositional formulas obtained
from P by applying modus ponens and substitution once:
〈P 〉 := {B | A,A→ B ∈ P for some formula A}∪
{σA | A ∈ P and σ is a substitution} .
Furthermore, let 〈P 〉
0
= P and
〈P 〉n+1 = 〈〈P 〉n〉
for n ≥ 0. It follows easily that 〈P 〉n ⊆ 〈P 〉n+1 for all n ≥ 0 and the set [P ] of all derivable
formulas of the calculus P can be represented as
[P ] = 〈P 〉∞ =
⋃
n≥0
〈P 〉n .
Let A be a formula derivable from P . We say that A has the derivation height n, if A ∈ 〈P 〉n
and A /∈ 〈P 〉n−1.
Consider the tag system T and the calculus PT,ω,P0. Let T halts on the input word ω,
we take the minimal n ≥ 0 such that 〈PT,ω,P0〉n contains at least one substitution instance
of the code of some word α ∈ A∗ with |α| < d:
Nω = min{n ≥ 0 | Code
∗(α) ∩ 〈PT,ω,P0〉n 6= ∅, for some α ∈ A
∗ with |α| < d}.
If T does not halt, then we put Nω =∞. Recall that Code
∗(α) is the set of all substitution
instances of formulas in Code(α). Denote PT,P0 = PT ∪ {H}.
Lemma 3.17. 〈PT,ω,P0〉Nω ⊆ Code
∗
T (ω) ∪ P
∗
T,P0
for all ω ∈ A∗.
Proof. We will prove by induction on n ≤ Nω that
〈PT,ω,P0〉n ⊆ Code
∗
T (ω) ∪ P
∗
T,P0
.
If n = 0, then 〈PT,ω,P0〉0 = PT,ω,P0. It can easily be checked that the axiom Wω is in
Code
∗
T (ω) and all the other axioms of PT,ω,P0 are in P
∗
T,P0
.
Let the induction assumption be satisfied for some 1 ≤ n < Nω. Since the right-hand
side of the inclusion is closed under substitution, we only consider the case of a formula
B obtained by modus ponens from some formulas A, A → B ∈ 〈PT,ω,P0〉n. By induction
hypothesis,
〈PT,ω,P0〉n ⊆ Code
∗
T (ω) ∪ P
∗
T,P0
.
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We claim that (1) A → B ∈ P ∗T,P0, and (2) A ∈ Code
∗
T (ω). Proofs are below. Then we will
show that B ∈ Code∗T (ω), which suffices for proving Lemma 3.17.
Note that Code∗T (ω) ∩ P
∗
T,P0
= ∅, due to Lemma 3.8.
Proof of (1): Assume the contrary: A→ B ∈ Code∗T (ω). Since ⊲ is the premise of any
code of any word, we have A ∈ ⊲∗. However, A ∈ Code∗T (ω) ∪ P
∗
T,P0
, which is impossible,
because all formulas in Code∗T (ω) and P
∗
T,P0
have the form (⊲ → C) or (⊲ → C) → D, for
some C, D, and so are not unifiable with ⊲ by Lemma 3.8.
Proof of (2): Assume the contrary: A ∈ P ∗T,P0. Then A is a substitution instance of a
formula of the from (⊲ → C) → D, for some C, D. By (1), A → B ∈ P ∗T,P0. So, A → B
is a substitution instance of a formula of the from (⊲→ E) → F , for some E and F . This
would apply that (⊲→ C) is unifiable with ⊲, which is impossible by Lemma 3.8.
We are going to show that B ∈ Code∗T (ω). Since A ∈ Code
∗(ξ) for some word ξ ∈ A+
such that ω
T
7=⇒ ξ, and A → B is a substitution instance of some of the 5 axioms in PT,P0,
we need to consider the following 5 cases.
Case 1. A→ B is a substitution instance of the axiom T1. Hence
A ∈ (⊲→ −−→aiαy)
∗
for some letter ai ∈ A and a word α ∈ A
∗ such that |α| = d − 1. Since the formula
A ∈ Code∗(ξ), it is easily shown by Lemma 3.7 that
A ∈ (⊲→ −−→aiαγ)
∗
for some γ ∈ A+, so that ξ = aiαγ. Therefore B is the substitution instance of the code
⊲→ −→γ ∨ −→ωi
for the word ζ = γωi and ξ
T
7−→ ζ .
Case 2. A→ B is a substitution instance of the axiom T2. Hence
A ∈ (⊲→ −→aiα)
∗
for some letter ai ∈ A and a word α ∈ A
∗ such that |α| = d − 1. So, ξ = aiα. Therefore B
is the substitution instance of the code
⊲→ −→ωi
for the word ζ = ωi and ξ
T
7−→ ζ .
Case 3. A→ B is a substitution instance of the axiom H. This case is impossible, since
otherwise we would have A ∈ (⊲→ −→α )∗ for some α ∈ A∗, 0 < |α| < d. This contradicts to
the fact that
(⊲→ −→α )
∗
∩ 〈PT,ω,P0〉n 6= ∅
and n < Nω.
Case 4. A→ B is a substitution instance of the axiom R1. Hence
A ∈ (⊲→ (y ∨ −→az) ∨ u)
∗
for some a ∈ A. Since the formula A ∈ Code∗(ξ), we have by Lemma 3.7 that
A ∈
(
⊲→
(←−
ξ1 ∨
−→
aξ2
)
∨
−→
ξ3
)∗
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for some ξ1, ξ2, ξ3 ∈ A
+ such that ξ = ξ1aξ2ξ3. Therefore B is a substitution instance of the
code
⊲→
(←−
ξ1a ∨
−→
ξ2
)
∨
−→
ξ3
for the same word ξ = ξ1aξ2ξ3.
Case 5. A→ B is a substitution instance of the axiom R2. Hence
A ∈ (⊲→←−ya ∨ z)
∗
for some a ∈ A. Since the formula A ∈ Code∗(ξ), we have by Lemma 3.7 that
A ∈
(
⊲→
←−
ξ1a ∨
−→
ξ2
)∗
for some ξ1, ξ2 ∈ A
+ such that ξ = ξ1aξ2. Therefore B is the substitution instance of the
code
⊲→
←−
ξ1 ∨
−→
aξ2
for the same word ξ = ξ1aξ2.
Cases 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 exhaust all possibilities and so we have that B ∈ Code∗(ζ) for some
word ζ ∈ A∗ such that ξ
T
7=⇒ ζ . Then B ∈ Code∗T (ω), since ω
T
7=⇒ ξ by induction hypothesis.
The proof is completed.
Now we prove that the code of each nonempty word over A derivable from PT,ω,P0 with
the derivation height less then or equal to Nω is the code of a word produced from ω by the
tag system T .
Corollary 3.18. If Code∗(α) ∩ 〈PT,ω,P0〉Nω 6= ∅ then ω
T
7=⇒ α, for all α ∈ A+.
Proof. By Lemma 3.17, we have
〈PT,ω,P0〉Nω ⊆ Code
∗
T (ω) ∪ P
∗
T,P0
.
Furthermore, the application of Lemma 3.8 yields
Code
∗
T (ω) ∩ P
∗
T,P0
= ∅.
It is obvious that Code∗(α)∩P ∗T,P0 = ∅. Hence Code
∗(α)∩Code∗T (ω) 6= ∅, and so ω
T
7=⇒ α by
definition of the set Code∗T (ω). The lemma is proved.
4 The proof of Theorem 2.7
Let us show that the following problem is undecidable: given a tag system T and a word
ω ∈ A, determine whether P0 ≤ PT,ω,P0.
Indeed, if the tag system T halts on the input word ω, then ω
T
7=⇒ α for some word
α ∈ A+ such that |α| < d. Hence the code ⊲ → −→α of α is derivable from PT,ω,P0 by
Corollary 3.16. If we recall that PT,ω,P0 contains the formula
(⊲→ −→α )→ A
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for every A ∈ P0, we obtain that P0 ≤ PT,ω,P0.
Now assume P0 ≤ PT,ω,P0. Since Int{→} ≤ P0, so by Lemma 3.6, we have
PT,ω,P0 ⊢ ⊲→
−→α
for every α such that |α| < d. Hence Nω < ∞. Fix any word α with |α| < d such that
Code
∗(α)∩ 〈PT,ω,P0〉Nω 6= ∅. By Corollary 3.18, we obtain ω
T
7=⇒ α. Therefore, T halts on ω.
Thus, we reduce the halting problem of tag systems to the problem of recognizing ex-
tensions for the Σ-calculus P0. Since the halting problem of tag systems is undecidable by
Theorem 3.2 and PT,ω,P0 ≤ P0 by Corollary 3.10, this completes the proof of undecidability of
recognizing completeness. As corollary we have the undecidability of problem of recognizing
axiomatizations.
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